Battle of Vargas Swamp 25 July 1819

The Battle of Vargas Swamp (Batalla del Pantano de Vargas), fought on 25 July 1819, was the bloodiest battle of the 1819 campaign but set the scene for the liberation of New Granada. I cover the historical situation, the battle itself, the terrain and the two orders of battle.

[Note: Vargas Swamp is the first battle in my 1815-1819 War in the North Wargaming Project.]

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Historical Situation

The battle was fought in Tunja Province of the Viceroyalty of New Granada (in what is now Colombia) in an area between the towns of Paipa and Tibasosa known as the Pantano de Vargas (Vargas Swamp). I think Vargas was the name of a guy who lived in the area. The swamp no longer exits.

My summary of the battle is based on Lozano (1980), Rodriquez (2006), Wikipedia: Battle of Vargas Swamp, Batalla del Pantano de Vargas [Spanish] and Wikipedia: José María Barreiro Manjón. Broadly these accounts align but each offers some slight detail.

Preliminaries

In January 1818, Colonel José María Barreiro Manjón, who was in Venezuela at the time, was informed he was the new commander of III Division of the Expeditionary Army of Costa Firme based in New Granada. Barreiro arrived in Santa Fé de Bogotá – the capital – on 4 August 1818 and brought Venezuelan reinforcements with him. At the time III Division had about 3,000 infantry, organised into four battalions, and 600 cavalry. New Granada was largely pacified and Barreiro dispersed his men widely.

In early 1819 Simon Bolívar sent the New Granadan general Francisco de Paula Santander to New Granada, to raise troops in the eastern plains region of Casanare. Casanare was separated from the main part of New Granada by the Cordillera Oriental. Morillo, the Royalist commander-in-chief, got wind of this and ordered Barreiro to clear the rebel province.

In March 1819 Barreiro led a Royalist force of 1,800 men across the Cordillera Oriental into Casanare. A combination of Barreiro’s passive strategy, lack of supplies and inhospitable climate lead to failure. In mid April Barreiro and his exhausted force withdrew back towards central New Granada. With the rainy season starting Barreiro settled into the city of Tunja to wait out the rain. Given in inhospitable season, he thought the Patriots would find it impossible to start any new operations.

Bolívar heard about Barreiro’s failed operation and on 23 May 1819 held a Council of War at Mantecal. Bolívar shared his intention to attack New Granada via relatively easy route through Cucuta (not Casanare). Even this watered down version of his strategy was sufficient to cause two Patriot generals – Iribairren and Rangel – to pull out. None-the-less, on 26 May the Bolívar’s Venezuelan army began marching across the flooded plains of Apure. On 3 June, at Guasdualito, Bolívar shared his real intention to attack via Casanare. The next day, the Venezuelans crossed the Arauca River and entered the equally flooded plains of Casanare, the only difference being that they were now in the llanos of New Granada. They met up with Santander’s New Granadan forces at Tame on 11 or 15 June 1819. The combined force then headed for the Paramo de Pisba pass across the Cordillera Oriental. The vanguard started to climb the mountains on 22 June and arrived at Socha on 5 July with the rear guard a day behind them. The British Legion was even further behind and had to catch up. By the time the Patriots reached Socha they lacked uniforms and munitions, had lost all their horses and cattle, and suffered about 100 dead and 500 sick. The Britons had lost 2 officers and 60 men, 25% of their strength. The people of the Tunja Province provided what aid they could, providing recruits, food, horses, and patch work uniforms, plus tending the sick.

In Tunja, Barreiro had heard about the approaching Patriots. The border between the two provinces extended almost 250 km and there are seven passes across the Cordillera Oriental. Barreiro had decided to garrison the easiest approach, the one in the Tenza Valley, because he considered the Paramo de Pisba and others impassable in winter. However, the Royalists did have men on the Paramo de Pisba route; two companies (about 300 men under sergeant major Juan Figueroa y Ladron) were stationed in the town of Paya. The Royalists at Paya met the Patriot vanguard (under Santander) and, when he realised he was facing an invasion army, Figueroa withdrew towards the main mountain pass at Labranzagrande. Although Barreiro was informed of these moves, as was typical for the man, he chose to wait and see what happened. Barreiro did, however, order the concentration of III Division at Tunja and his men began to trickle in.

On 5 July Barreiro received firm sighting of Patriots between Paya and Pisba (actually 500 of their cattle). Then on 6 July he heard the Patriots had moved towards the moor towards Pisba and Socotá. Barreiro knew the Patriots were in Socha and in a deplorable state, but he continued to wait for III Division to concentrate.

The frustrated Viceroy Samano sent Colonel Sebastián de la Calzada to take over command of III Division. But Barreiro refused the order as the viceroy lacked the authority to change commanders (only Morillo could) and it would “Stain his honour as a military officer”. Barreiro sent de la Calzada back to Santa Fe.

At dawn on 8 July, Barreiro marched his forces out of Tunja towards Sogamoso, but ended up pulling back to the town of Paipa.

10 July saw small scale fighting at Corrales, Gámeza, and Molinos de Tópaga. On the Patriot side, only the Vanguard was involved.

11 July saw a larger battle at Gameza. The Royalists took a large number of Patriot prisoners. Barreiro had the prisoners executed by bayonet to save ammunition.

The encounters at Corrales, Gámeza, and Molinos de Tópaga were close but indecisive. Bolívar decided a frontal attack on Sogamoso wasn’t working and began a flank march on the Tibasosa-Paipa road, in order to surprise the Royalists at Paipa. He would have to cross the flooded Chicamocha river.

14-15 July British legion crossed the Andes, trying to catch up to the Patriots.

On 20 July Barreiro heard the the Patriot army was moving again.

On 22 July, the British Legion rejoined the Patriot army.

The Patriots dedicated 23-24 July to constructing rafts.

At 0500 hours on 25 July the Patriot rafts were complete and the army began their crossing of the Chicamocha at Puente de Balsa. They had crossed by 1000 hours. Bolívar sent 40 infantrymen of the Cazadores battalion ahead to reconnoitre. These infantrymen settled into position on a hill near Vargas swamp called Cruz de Murcia.

Around 0700 or 0800 hours, Barreiro heard of the Patriot crossing. He quickly marched out of Paipa towards the Patriot route of march. The Royalist vanguard – infantry of the 1st del Rey battalion and cavalry – encountered the 40 Patriot caazdores at 1000 hours and annihilated them. The Royalists continued their march and at 1100 hours arrived at Barreiro’s chosen battlefield. This was choke point on the road between Picacho Hill and Cangrejo Hill. The position was further strength with the Vargas Swamp protecting the Royalist left and steep hills on the right.

The Royalists deployed in three lines:
Royalist Line 1: The Tambo Light Infantry Regiment (Batallón Ligero de Infantería del Tambo) occupied Cangrejo Hill on the left and the road/gorge between the hills. The del Rey Regiment (1st and 2nd battalions) deployed on the right flank, on Picacho Hill.
Royalist Line 2: Fernando VII Hussars (Húsares de Fernando VII) behind Tambo on the road. The Numancia Regiment (2nd and 3rd battalions) supporting del Rey.
Royalist Line 3 (reserve): Barreiro set up his HQ at the Casa de la Seis Ventanas (although some source mentions José Antonio Díaz House or House of Vargas), keeping the bulk of the cavalry – Granadan Dragons (Dragones de Granada) and King’s Own Horse Grenadiers (Granaderos del Rey) – with him as a reserve

The battle

The Patriot army arrived at 1200 hours and immediately engaged.

Anzoátegui’s rearguard division attacked along the road and up Cangrejo Hill. Some of Anzoátegui’s Venezuelans also helped Santander’s vanguard division against Picacho Hill. As far as I can tell they were in three lines like the Royalists:

Patriot Line 1: The Venezuelan Rifles (Colonel Arthur Sandes) were facing Cangrejo Hill on the Patriot right. Attacking Picacho Hill were the Venezuelan Barcelona Battalion (Colonel Ambrosio Plaza) in the centre and the New Granadan Vanguard Cazadores battalion (Colonel Joaquín París) on the extreme Patriot left.
Patriot Line 2: Venezuelan Bravos of Páez, the British Legion and New Granadan 1st of the Line.
Patriot Line 3: All of the cavalry with Bolivar.

The Patriot first line – the Rifles, Barcelona, and the Cazadores battalions – advanced into and through the Varguitas ravine before ascending the steep slope of the Royalist held hills.

Barreiro ordered 1st del Rey (Colonel Nicolás López), on the Royalist right, to conduct a flanking manoeuvre to the right against the Cazadores battalion facing them. The sources are ambiguous, and I suspect this was just a realignment so the 1st del Rey were facing the advancing Patriot Cazadores, rather than an actual attempt at envelopment. 1st Numancia isn’t really mentioned in the sources, and I suspect they filled the gap formed in the Royalist line as 1st del Rey moved to the right. The Tambo Battalion (Colonel Francisco Jiménez) charged in the centre and left and pushed the Patriots back towards the Varguitas ravine.

Bolívar sent the 1st of the Line infantry battalion (Colonel Antonio Obando) forward and the Patriots had another go at the hills. They drove the Royalists back to their initial positions.

Barreiro sent the Grenadiers of the 2nd Numancia Battalion (Colonel Juan Tolrá) in to support the 1st del Rey and Tambo battalions. [“support the 1st del Rey and Tambo” is what the sources say, but this would be tricky as 1st del Rey and Tambo were on opposite ends of the Royalist line; I suspect this just means “support the first line” rather than suggesting specific movements.] Through fierce fighting the Royalists again pushed the Patriots off the hills.

Bolívar, with his staff, were in the thick of the fighting. The Liberator personally intervened to rally the Rifles and Barcelona who were losing ground against 1st and 2nd Numancia.

Next Bolívar sent the Bravos of Páez (Colonel Justo Briceño) and the British Legion (Colonel James Rooke) to support Santander against Picacho Hill. The British Legion attacked the Royalist right with considerable fire discipline, although the sources disagree on how this discipline manifested. Perez Vila said:

Under a hail of bullets, the veterans of Waterloo -with their leader, Colonel James Rook, at their head – advanced in perfectly formed lines, stopping every fifteen steps to fire a volley that inflicted great casualties on the enemy. Electrified by this example, the Rifle and Barcelona battalions threw themselves with renewed vigour againswt the Spaniards. The Royalists retreated and the Patriot line crowned the heights.

But other sources (Vawell’s first hand account for example) say the British withheld their fire until the last moment, then delivered a devastating volley and charged with the bayonet. Fire-once-and-charge was the classic British tactic of the Peninsular War, although an advancing fire was also used on occasion. Either way the advance of the British Legion established the Patriots positioned back on the hill, although Rooke was gravely wounded.

Barreiro now committed his reserve. Two companies (4th and 6th) of the Granadan Dragoons (Colonel Salazar) were ordered to dismount and fight as infantry. The dismounted dragoons and the remaining two companies from the 2nd Numancia Battalion joined the line on Picacho Hill. The Ferdinand VII Hussars (Lt. Colonel Francsico Góngora) were deployed on the main road bordering the swamp and slowly pushed back Anzoátegui’s rearguard division (which I think, at this point means the Rifles since the rest of the division were on Picacho Hill). With these reinforcements the Royalists stabilised their line and pushed the patriots back in Royalist left and centre.

With the advantage of higher ground, the Royalist army had held the line for five gruelling hours. The Patriots had failed dislodge them from the hills and road.

At 1700 hours the Patriots began to fall back in disorder. Seeing this, in a notable moment of hubris, Barreiro shouted “Long live Spain, not even God can take this victory away from me” and ordered a counter-attack. The Royalist infantry attacked frontally while the cavalry attacked on the main road on the flank near the Vargas swamp, through the narrow gorge between the hills. The Royalists almost encircled the Patriots.

In a do or die moment, Bolívar ordered the last reserves forward. Lt. Colonel Juan Jóse Rondón and 14 lancers of the 1st Lancers of the Upper Plains (Primero de Lanceros de Llano Arriba) charged up Cangrejo Hill into the Royalist infantry and dismounted cavalry (either Ferdinand VII Hussars or, more likely, the Granada Dragoons). The Royalists were caught by surprise and pushed off the hill.

Brigaded under Colonel Lucas Carvajal of the Mellao Dragoons (Dragones de Mellao), the rest of Patriot cavalry followed Rondón and charged down the road. They broke the Ferdinand VII Hussars and killed most of them in the route, including their commander. Meanwhile the Santander’s vanguard and the British Legion attacked Picacho Hill again and finally dislodged the Royalist infantry.

Heavy rainfall put an end to the fighting at 1800 hours. Barreiro retreated towards Paipa with the Tambo infantry battalion as rear guard. The Patriots had also taken a mauling and Bolívar decided to retreat towards the Chicamocha River.

A local Presbyter, Andres Maria Gallo, who observed the battle noted “I saw the battle lost at 5, and won at 6.”

In this Pyrrhic Victory, the Patriots took 300–400 casualties and the Royalists having suffered 500-400 casualties.

Barreiro claimed a grand victory but the Patriot victory was clear as, over the next few days, the rival armies raced for the capital Santa Fé de Bogotá.

The two armies had a rematch at the Battle of Boyacá (7 August 1819). This was a decisive Patriot victory and marked the beginning o New Granada’s permanent independence.

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Map / Battlefield / Terrain

Vargas Swamp had a busy 3D battlefield. The key elements were the swamp itself, steep hills, road, ravine, and woods. Basically swamp to the west, hills to the east, road up the middle, and ravine kind of running south-east to north-west. Mosts hills are steep. A couple are also wooded.

Swamp

Right, Pantano de Vargas literally means means “Vargas’s Swamp”. Despite the name it wasn’t obviously swampy; there were no pools of water and reeds. It was called a swamp because the earth was soft and wet. This area of soft ground dominated the area to the west and north of the road.

Steep hills

It took a while for me to make sense of the geography of the Battle of Vargas Swamp. The accounts talk about two hills south of the Varguitas ravine: Cerro del Picacho (Picacho Hill) on Royalist right/east and Cerro del Cangrejo (Cangrejo Hill; literally Crab Hill) on Royalist left/west. I couldn’t find them on the maps, so I went looking.

Originally I had four maps of the area: Google earth (digital coordinates 5.7375, -73.075), a big map from 1918 from Wikipedia, a small modern map also from Wikipedia, the map from the scenario in John Fletcher’s book (2011). The maps match to google earth but they all show slightly different things. And none of them call out Picacho Hill or Cangrejo Hill.

The older and more impressive map is called “Plano Topográfico del Campo en que tuvo lugar el Combate del Pantano de Vargas (25 de Julio de 1819) – Bogota, noviembre 16 de 1918.” The Plano is lovely and detailed, but it shows the Royalists all deployed on a single hill – Alto de la Guerra (The War Heights) – with no mention of Picacho Hill or Cangrejo Hill. My guess was Alto de la Guerra was Picacho Hill but where was Cangrejo Hill?

The next clue was the map “Batalla del Pantano de Vargas – Área de Operaciones”, also from Wikipedia. The operational area has a Patriot attack going in against both Alto de la Guerra – renamed Cerro de la Guerra (The War Hill) – and a smaller height to the left. On the Plano that smaller hill is called Cerro de los Sepulcros (Sepulchre Hill).

With a bit more research I found the monumento a los lanceros – honouring the Llaneros lancers who won the battle – is located on Sepulchre Hill. Wikipedia: Lanceros del Pantano de Vargas says “The monument is located on the site of the Battle of the Vargas Swamp”. So it seemed Sepulchre Hill was the hill the Patriot lancers charged up.

So my guess was:

Cerro de Picacho (Picacho Hill) is the giant hill labelled on the Plano as Alto de la Guerra (The War Heights) and on Wikipedia’s operational area map as Cerro de la Guerra (The War Hill).

Cerro del Cangrejo (Cangrejo Hill) is the smaller feature to the left / west of big hill and is called Cerro de los Sepulcros (Sepulchre Hill) on the Plano. The road runs through a gorge between Picacho Hill and Cangrejo Hill.

My guess was confirmed when Nicolas Felipe Isquith Carreño pointed me at the article “Pantano De Vargas Battle. July 25 1819, Paipa, Boyacá, Nueva Granada. Other Histories Of The Past” (Rodríguez & Borrero, 2014). Figure 1 on page 70 has the topology and the hills labelled correctly. Yay.

Two other features are north of the ravine: La Peña (The Sorrow) and Cerro del Liberator (The Liberator Hill). The Liberator Hill is the name given after the battle as this is where Bolívar watched the battle. La Peña is to the right flank, and offered a more gentle approach to the Royalist lines.

So the map for a scenario should include four big hills: Picacho Hill, Cangrejo Hill, La Peña (The Sorrow), and Cerro del Liberator (The Liberator Hill). Of these, La Peña is probably a gentle hill, but the others are all steep. And any other unnamed hill features should be steep as well.

Ravine

The Patriot attack went in across la quebrada Varguitas (the Varguitas ravine). This runs south-east to north-west across the battlefield. The Patriots have to cross it to attack the hills.

Woods

Some of the hills were wooded but not all. Picacho Hill was covered in trees, as was The Liberator Hill – they still are. These two were both steep and wooded.

Annotated map

So here is a new version of the Plano but annotated to show the key features. The white box is an area 1800 metres by 1200 metres, corresponding to the area in which the battle is most likely to been fought.

Royalist Order of Battle

Representing the Royalists was Lt. Col. Jose Maria Barreiro’s 3rd Division (Marley, 1998).

I’ve found four orders of battle Cortés (1969), which is reproduced in Batalla del Pantano de Vargas [Spanish], Fletcher (2011), Lozano (1980) and Linares (1989). I have combined them and tweaked with notes.

Notes:
(1) Linares (1989) gives del Rey 1,100 men. Cortés (1969) and Fletcher (2011) give del Rey only 700 men; 500 men in 1st del Rey and 200 in 2nd del Rey. I’m going with Linares and split evenly. However the sources talk about only a few companies of 2nd del Rey.

(2) Linares (1989) gives both 2nd and 3rd Numancia 300 men. Cortés (1969) also has 600 men in total but splits it differently; 500 for 2nd and 100 for 3rd. Fletcher (2011) has 3rd del Rey present but this might be a typo for 3rd Numancia, which he leaves out. Again, I’m following Linares.

(3) Batalla del Pantano de Vargas [Spanish] mentions the Tambo Battalion, under the command of Francisco Jiménez, but strangely leaves it out of the order of battle. Presumably Cortés (1969) didn’t have this unit. But we know the Tambo battalion held Cangrejo Hill and later was the rear guard in the retreat. And, apparently, their commander, Colonel Francisco Jiménez, was Barreiro’s second in command. Jiménez was 19 years old at the time. Linares (1989) has the Tambo battalion with 900 men; I’m going with that.

(4) Cortés (1969) has 550 cavalrymen split across the Granadan Dragoon Regiment (Dragones de Granada) (350 men), the King’s Own Horse Grenadiers (Granaderos del Rey) (100 men) and Fernando VII Hussars (Húsares de Fernando VII) (100 men). Fletcher (2011) only lists the Granadan Dragoons and gives them 500 men. Linares (1989) and Lozano (1980) also have 500 men, but mention all three units.

(5) The battle narrative suggests the Granadan Dragoons Regiment were active on both Picacho Hill and Cangrejo Hill. There were quite a lot of them, with 300-350 men. I think this supports breaking the regiment up into squadrons.

(6) The infantry total is where the big disagreement is … how many Royalist infantry were present. Cortés (1969) and Fletcher (2011) both give 1,300, but have left out the large Tambo battalion. Lozano (1980) says 3,000 but doesn’t give a breakdown. Linares (1989) has 2,600 including Tambo.

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Patriot Order of Battle

In this campaign Simon Bolívar called his army the Ejército Libertador de Nueva Granada y Venezuela (Liberation Army of New Granada and Venezuela), but I suspect most people called them “the Patriots” or perhaps “Bolivar’s lot”.

In addition to the four orders of battle I used for the Royalists – Cortés (1969), which is reproduced in Batalla del Pantano de Vargas [Spanish], Fletcher (2011), Lozano (1980) and Linares (1989) – I also used Rodriquez (2006). I have combined them and tweaked with notes.

Notes:
(1) Cortés (1969), Fletcher (2011) and Linares (1989) call the unit the Cazadore Battalion (Batallón “Cazadores”). These were from New Granada hence the occasional “de la Nueva Granada” in the sources. Hooker (1991) calls them “Cazadores Constantes de la Nueva Granada” (Constant Hunters of New Granada). Linares gives them 300 men and Cortés 400.

(2) The 1st Line Battalion (Batallón “Primero de Línea”) were another unit raised in New Granada. Linares (1989) gives them 400 men and Cortés (1969) 600.

(3) I’m not sure who led the cavalry brigade. Colonel Juan José Rondón of the Primero de Lanceros de Llano Arriba led the first and decisive charge. Lt. Colonel Lucas Carvajal of the Dragones de Mellao coordinated the rest of the cavalry in their final charge up the road. Which, it has to be said, is odd because as a Lt. Colonel he was outranked by all three other cavalry commanders. And Simon Bolívar had retained all of the Patriot cavalry in reserve near him. But, on balance, I think it was Rondón; he was the man that Bolívar first turned to.

(4) Apure is in Venezuela so I assumed Guias de Apure was Venezuelan. Rodriquez confirms this and that this guides squadron began the journey with Bolívar. Santander had raised New Granadan cavalry, so I wonder why the cavalry attached to his division were Venezuelan.

(5) Rodriquez (2006, p. 258) says “In terms of cavalry, [Bolívar started his trek with] two regiments of the ‘Alto Llano de Caracas’, a regiment of ‘Guias de la Guardia’ and a squadron of ‘Guias de Apure'”. The Guias de Apure are mentioned in other sources. I imagine the Alto Llano de Caracas are the Lanceros de Llano Arriba, although they were squadrons, not regiments. The Guias de la Guardia are less obvious, but, if the unit still existed at Vargas Swamp, it must be the Guías de Mujica. Then on p. 308, Rodriquez gives Bolívar, “3 regiments of dismounted cavalry (800 men): Hussars, Llanos de Arriba and Guides”. Again guides and Llaneros are clear. Not sure about the “hussars” although these might the guards he mentioned, as Bolívar often has an honour guard in hussar uniform. It is worth noting the commented that all of these Venezuelan cavalry were dismounted when they went over the Andes. This wasn’t true for the New Granadan horse under Santander.

(6) Cortés (1969) gives a total infantry force of 1,970. Linares (1989) has 1,820.

(7) Linares (1989) says 300 spread across “Guías, Lanceros y Dragones”. He seems to have assigned each 100 men. Cortés (1969) teases this apart a bit more and gives two squadrons if guides and two of lancers and then gives all five squadrons 100 men, making a total of 500 cavalry.

(8) Rodriquez (2006, p. 258) says that, in addition to the 2,500 fighting men, the army was “accompanied by a sizeable force of porters”.

(9) Rodriquez (2006) says that because the British Legion was formed from men on the first ships under George Elsom, they were likely to be have been true veterans of the Napoleonic Wars.

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References

Cardona-Angarita, J. M., Trujillo Hassan, D., & Ojeda Pérez, R. (2020). La organización social de los ejércitos en la batalla de Boyacá: reconstrucción georreferen- ciada. Revista Científica General José María Córdova, 18(32), 945-967. http://dx.doi. org/10.21830/19006586.665. [Available on-line http://www.scielo.org.co/pdf/recig/v18n32/2500-7645-recig-18-32-944.pdf]

Cortés, C. (1969). Batalla del Pantano de Vargas 1819. Bogotá: Sección de Historia y Publicaciones del Ejército de Colombia.

Documentos históricos de Colombia (2018). La campaña libertadora de 1819 Tomo III. Volume 8 of Historia de Colombia-La independencia. Publisher Ediciones LAVP.

Fletcher, J. (2011). Adventures of the British & Irish Legions in South America 1817-1824: Gamer’s Guide & Sourcebook. Grenadier Productions.

Hooker, T. (1991). The Armies of Bolívar and San Martin [Men-at-Arms 232]. Osprey.

Linares, H. G. (1989). La marcha libertadora de 1819. Conmemoraciones Revista FF.AA., 132, pp. 27-34.

Lozano Cleves, A. (1980). Así Se Hizo La Independencia (2nd Ed.). Biblioteca Banco Popular.

Luqui-Lagleyze, J. M., and Manzano-Lahoz, A. (1998). «Los Realistas» (1810-1826): Virreinatos del Perú y del Rio de la Plata, y Capitanía General de Chile [Hombres en Uniforme No 5]. Quiron Ediciones. [Spanish]

Marley, D. F. (1998). Wars of the Americas: A chronology of armed conflict in the New World, 1492 to the present. ABC-CLIO.

Rodriquez, M. E. (2006). Freedom’s Mercenaries: British Volunteers in the Wars of Independence of Latin America; Volume 1: Northern South America. Hamilton Books.

Rodríguez Cuenca, J. V. and Borrero F., L. D. (2014). La Batalla Del Pantano De Vargas. 25 De Julio De 1819, Paipa, Boyacá, Nueva Granada. Las Otras Historias Del Pasado. (Pantano De Vargas Battle. July 25 1819, Paipa, Boyacá, Nueva Granada. Other Histories Of The Past). Maguaré, 28(2), pp. 65-102. [Available on-line https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/5298334.pdf]

Wikipedia: Battle of Vargas Swamp

Batalla del Pantano de Vargas [Spanish]

Wikipedia: Lanceros del Pantano de Vargas [Spanish]

Wikipedia: José María Barreiro Manjón