Line, column, square … the tactical formations available to infantry of the Napoleonic Wars, South American Wars of Liberation, and Carlist Wars. Line is pretty straight forward but I thought I’d describe the others, in particular column. People think of columns as long and thin, and some were, but most columns of the Napoleonic Wars were usually stubby. I use the post 1808 French as the main example because the Spanish followed their lead, but the other nations were similar.
[Note: I wrote this while Musing on unit types in Bolivar’s Very Bad Day. Battalion formations were very much on my mind as I design Bolivar’s Very Bad Day.]
Column, line, and square
Infantry battalions only had three tactical formations: columns to facilitate movement, lines to maximise firepower, and squares to provide a defence against cavalry (Haythornthwaite, 2001, p. 85). But there were lots of variations, particularly of columns. I’ll also briefly consider French blobs.
In this post I focus on the French in the period 1808-1815. There are a couple of reasons for this: French companies were colour coded which helps in the diagrams and the Spanish used the same organisation and formations.
A number of progressive Spanish officers had been advocating adopted the French columnar tactics from 1796 (Esdaile, 2012) and in 1803 the Spanish adopted the French regulations of 1791 (Cronin & Summerfield, 2014). The same regulations the French used during the entire Napoleonic Wars. And they seemed to follow the 1808 reorganisation as well, at least by 1810. So, from about 1810, the six company battalion was also the most common Spanish organisation in the Peninsular and in South America. The Spanish also used the same structure in the later Carlist Wars. So whatever I learn about the French can apply to the Spanish post 1810. Of course the same principle apply to other nations, e.g. British and Portuguese, just the number of companies changed. That had implications for how the other nations changed formation, but they all used line, column, and square.
The 1791 regulations remained in force in the French army throughout the revolutionary and Napoleonic period (Griffith, 2007). Although frowned on by the revolutionary political masters, these regulations were used by any serious military figure. The 1808 reorganisation did to change the regulations but did reduce the number of companies per battalion to six: four fusilier, a grenadier and a voltigeur company. The reorganised battalion had a frontage of 171 yards (156 metres).
Paddy Griffith described the role of lines and columns in the 1791 regulations (Griffith, 2007, p. 10):
A commander would always wish to fight with his troops in line presenting a solid front of fire to the enemy. However, it was also accepted that he might need to use various complex combinations – including variants of the column – to bring them forward into the front line over broken ground or from the roads on which they had originally approached the battlefield. The columns would ideally deploy into firing lines just before they came into musketry range of the enemy.
Formation changes could be conducted quite quickly outside combat. For example, one of the more tricky changes from column to square would take only 60 seconds (Nafziger, 1996). But any unit that tried to change formation in the face of enemy fire was in trouble (Griffith, 2007). Charging cavalry would close to contact in 60 seconds.
The example in the illustration is an understrength French battalion of 600 men following the 1808 reorganisation. This was the battalion structure used in the Peninsular War. The battalion has six companies/platoons each of about 100 men in 33 files and 3 ranks. The musketeers of each company occupy 18.5m x 0.975m; add another 1.3m depth for officers and NCOs behind the men making 18.5m x 2.3m.
Note: a company was an administrative unit (Nafziger, 1996). In contrast platoons were used in the field. Each company formed one platoon, but men were moved around to make the platoons a similar size.
Line
Line was the fighting formation – for fire action and assault (Rothenberg, 1997). It was used for both attack and defence (Rogers, 1974). As Paddy Griffith said (Griffith, 2007, p. 10):
A commander would always wish to fight with his troops in line presenting a solid front of fire to the enemy.
In defence a line should have been supported by other troops (Griffiths, 2007, p. 23):
The preferred formation for defence was always the deployed line, covered by skirmishers, artillery and preferably cavalry too, with columns held in reserve
When discussing Marshal Michael Ney’s “Instructions for the Troops Composing the Left Corps”, Arnold (2004) points out “All of the discussion of charges specifies a charge in line with the bayonet”. Concerning the principles of a charge in line Ney writes: “a French commander ought never to hesitate in marching against the enemy with the bayonet, if the ground is at all adapted to a charge in line with one or more battalions”. He notes how troops who stop their advance to open fire are very difficult to get moving again.
Infantry in line could stop cavalry to the front, for example Spanish infantry the Battle of Medellin (29 Mar 1809) repulsed the charge of two regiments of French dragoons (Esdaile, 2012). However, this was by no means certain and the flanks of infantry in line were vulnerable to cavalry. Lines threatened by cavalry would normally form square. Famously, Latour-Maubourg cavalry destroyed Colborne’s brigade at the Battle of Albuera (16 May 1811) when the 1st Vistula Legion Lancers and the 2nd Hussars ripped through Colborne’s exposed right flank and annihilated three of Colborne’s regiments within minutes; the fourth, the 31st Regiment of Foot, had sufficient time to form square and survived (Dempsey, 2008; Edwards, 2008; Oliver & Partridge, 2007).
Lines struggled when moving in difficult terrain; the advantage of columns, over lines, is always that they are better at manoeuvre, particularly in rough terrain (Arnold, 2004; Griffith, 1990, 2007; Nafziger, 1996; Rothenberg, 1997). Ranks would become ragged, the battalion might bow in the middle, or perhaps even break completely in half (napoleonistyka: Infantry Tactics and Combat (Part 2)).
Officially infantry formed 22 inches (56cm) per man (Haythornthwaite, 2008; Nosworthy, 1995). So a company of 60 men in two ranks would be 18 yards (16.75m) and a battalion of 600 men in two ranks about 180 yards (167.7m). However, these were theoretical frontages, and in battle the individuals spacings could rise to 27 (67cm) or even 30 inches (76cm) per man. [Nafziger (1996) agrees 22 inches for the British but says French were 26 inches. I go with the majority at 22 inches for the French with likelihood to expand in battle.]
The intervals between 1st, 2nd and 3rd rank were 0.325m for French infantry (Nafziger, 1996; napoleonistyka: Infantry Tactics and Combat (Part 2)). But these intervals varied from army to army. I’ve used Nafziger (1996) for the paces/inches and napoleonistyka for the metric conversation (although I’d get different measurements if I did the calculations). From smallest gap to largest:
French infantry – 13 inches (0.325 m)
Russian infantry – 14 inches (0.35 m)
British infantry – 1 pace (0.63 m)
Prussian infantry – 26 inches (0.66 m)
Austrian infantry – 2 paces (49.8 inches) (1.25 m)
The interval between 3rd rank and NCOs/officers behind was 1.3 m or 2 paces.
Taking all of that together, a nominal French battalion of 600 men from 1808. Each company has about 100 men in 33 files and 3 ranks. So the men of the company occupy 18.5m x 0.975m; add another 1.3m depth for officers and NCOs behind the men making 18.5m x 2.275m. In line, with the official frontage per man, the battalion would be 111m x 2.27m. In battle this might stretch out to 139m (152 yards).
The example shows the way a French line was supposed to be formed after the 1808 reorganisation to six companies. The companies were in order of seniority from the right, with the grenadiers first, then the four fusilier companies, and finally the voltigeur (light) company. In line the battalion is 113.5m long and 2.3m deep.
Square
Squares were used to defend against cavalry. The square provided a hedge of bayonets on all four sides and, in addition, the defenders could fire out of each side.
Good quality cavalry and well managed cavalry could break squares, even squares formed by good infantry. It just wasn’t very common. The Dragoons of the King’s German Legion broke a steady French square at the Battle of García Hernández (23 July 1812) (Rothenberg, 1997). Similarly, the 20th Chasseur à Cheval broke a Austrian square at the Battle of Wagram (5–6 July 1809); the 20th were charging another square but deviated when they saw their final target fired at the 7th Chasseurs.
Squares had two disadvantages. The firepower was drastically reduced and, being massed, they were vulnerable to artillery fire (Rothenberg, 1997).
According to the French regulations an infantry line should have been able to form square within 100 seconds (napoleonistyka: Infantry Tactics and Combat (Part 2)). An attack column (colonne d’attaque) would only need 30 seconds because the companies in a column of full or half intervals would be able to manoeuvre more freely. In the field these times would have been longer.
There were many ways to form a battalion ‘square’ (Griffith, 2007). I’ve shown the way a square was supposed to be formed after the 1808 reorganisation to six companies. The French calls this an square of six companies an “Egyptian square” (carré d’Egypte’) (Nafziger, 1996). Before 1808 the eight companies/platoons would form a symmetrical square.
Multiple squares were intended to provide mutual support (Nafziger, 1996). Typically they would be placed 120 paces (90m) apart and adjacent squares were positioned so each could fire from any face and miss their neighbours. There were two ways to achieve this: either the squares were in echelon or the battalions formed square in a line but with each on the diagonal, 45° to their original front (Griffith, 2007).
Squares could move as fast as other formations (Nafziger, 1996) and could move either from one of the faces or from a corner (Haythornthwaite, 2008). [I assume squares would struggle in difficult terrain, like line, as the troops had to maintain close alignment or lose the benefit of the square. Having said that, cavalry would also struggle in difficult terrain so this was probably not tested in practice.]
Squares would form with the normal number of ranks, 2 for the British and 3 for the French. If a commander wanted a stronger formation, they could double the rows on each face to 4 or 6 ranks (Haythornthwaite, 2008).
Column
Marshal Michael Ney, in his “Instructions for the Troops Composing the Left Corps”, “makes it very clear that the column’s purpose is to provide a rapid and flexible formation for approaching the combat zone” (Arnold, 2004). The charges were to be conducted by lines.
Colonel Napier thought so too (Napier, 1828, p 258-259)
The column is undoubtedly excellent for all movements short of the actual charge
and
Well managed columns are the very soul of military operations, in them is the victory, and in them also is safety to be found after a defeat. The secret consists in knowing when and where to extend the front [i.e. to deploy into line]
Griffith (1990, p. 35) explains that the French saw columns as the only way to get into musket range, particularly over difficult terrain:
All French authorities were agreed that the column was the best formation for movement, especially over difficult terrain. In the Peninsula the terrain was often broken and hilly, and on some battlefields such as Busaco or the Pyrenean passes it was well-nigh impossible. To bring their men into musket range, therefore, French generals would naturally have employed the column, and it was only on arrival at this [musket] range that they would have been faced with the choice of whether or not to deploy.
From 1805-1806, while manoeuvring, French divisions would keep all of their battalions in column (Nosworthy, 1995). Adjacent columns would form at “deployment distance” (Griffiths, 2007). The deployment distance was to enable each column enough space to form line, if required. According to the regulations the minimum deployment distance equivalent to one ‘interval’, i.e. the frontage of a company/platoon (napoleonistyka: Infantry Tactics and Combat (Part 2)). Less than that and the column would suffer disorder. But that minimum deployment distance would only give a four company frontage for a French line post 1808, so presumably wider deployment distances were preferred. Unlike a line, column did not have to be perfectly aligned with their neighbours as they were not reliant on other units to provide flank support (Rothenberg, 1997). The combination of a narrow frontage and ability to move independently of their neighbours, meant columns would move both faster and over rough ground. They could get the troops to the enemy. In addition column could quickly change into other formations e.g. line and square; the bigger the interval between successive companies/platoons, the more easy it was to change formation. Ultimately columns offered rapid movement and flexibility. Although the French are famous for inventing the columnar system, all nations used both line and column. The difference was that the French kept their battalions in column longer to maximise the flexibility.
Armies found ways to speed up manoeuvring. One way was the change from fixed pivots to floating pivots (Nafziger, 1996). In a fixed pivot the rows stocked lock step in line. Where with a floating pivot, each segment marched in a direct line to its final destination; this approach was much faster. The French were using floating pivots from 1791. The British were slower to adapt and although used floating pivots were relying on the fixed pivot in 1804.
The weakness of the column was firepower (Haythornthwaite, 2001; Muir, 1998). But attacks by columns were meant to be preceded by an artillery bombardment and a swarm of skirmishers. When these did their job, attack columns could roll over the enemy.
In his analysis of many Napoleonic battles, Griffith (2007) found that 78% of French attacks were made in column. He does caveat that the attacking battalions may have started in column and then deployed into line. Griffith (2007, p. 23) explains:
It was conventional wisdom that a battalion attack in column was supposed to deploy into line … to beat down the enemy by fire before driving him back. However, if the deployment was left too late and the enemy were resolute, the battalion would be thrown back in confusion … and very vulnerable to counter-attack, as happened on many occasions when facing British infantry. There were also occasions, e.g. when facing weak opponents or one very confined ground, when a command would wish to remain in column … without making any attempt to deploy, simply pushing on by sheer force of ‘shock’
Casualties were concentrated on the companies at the head of the column (Muir, 1998). These companies took more casualties than if the battalion had been advancing in line. But, ironically, it was the men at the rear of the column who probably suffered the greatest psychological strain and were most likely to give way first.
Under heavy fire it was impossible for a column to deploy into line (Haythornthwaite, 2001). “British eye witness accounts from the Peninsula often mention attempts to move from column into line that were shot down or otherwise aborted before they could be completed” (Griffith, 2007, p. 24)
Columns by division were usually much wider than they were deep (Haythornthwaite, 2001). A French attack column of 1808 was 40 men wide and 18 deep (ignoring skirmishers).
Columns were described by the width, density and function (Nosworthy, 1995).
Column width
Columns were described by the how wide they were, with the width defined by one of the sub-divisions (Nosworthy, 1995). Battalion columns formed on a frontage of one or two companies or a section (Haythornthwaite, 2001, Muir, 1998, Nafziger, 1996).
Column of divisions (colonne par division): Frontage of a division of two companies/platoons, with other divisions of the battalion arrayed behind. The British called this a column of grand divisions. The French call these an attack column (colonne d’attaque) when formed on the centre companies (3 and 4).
Column of companies/platoons (colonne par peloton): Frontage of one platoon with other platoons of battalion arrayed behind; only 18.5m wide.
Column of sections (colonne par section): Frontage of section, where a section was a sub-division of a platoon/company; 2 sections to a French platoon and 4 sections to a British platoon.
Remember that company was the administrative unit and platoon was the equivalent tactical unit. Section was purely tactical as they all had to be the same width.
The French favoured the attack column (column of divisions formed on 3 and 4 company) in Europe. But in Spain, where the battalions would detach the voltiguers as skirmishers, they favoured the column of platoons for manoeuvre (Nafziger, 1996)
A march column could be a file wide but normally files were doubled when the column was formed (Nafziger, 1996). So a British two deep file would become a four wide march column. French and Spanish march columns would be six men wide because they started as a 3 deep line.
The French also had a battalion column (colonne par bataillon) (Nosworthy, 1995). In this post I’ve use “battalion column” to mean a battalion in a column formation. However, the French term colonne par bataillon meant a column comprising a number of battalions, with each battalion in line.
Column density
Density was the distance or interval between consecutive companies/divisions (Haythornthwaite, 2001; Nosworthy, 1995). Density resulted in these columns:
Column at full interval (colonne de distance entiere) / Open column
Column at half interval (colonne de demi-distance)
Column at quarter interval
Close column (colonne serée)
In open column the distance between companies equalled the frontage (Haythornthwaite, 2008). This was called an interval in France. With a company frontage of approximately 20 yards (18.25m), the distance between companies would be 20 yards. Open columns, with their large company wide intervals, were excellent for changing formation e.g. into line and square (Muir, 1998). Each company could easily wheel right or left to form a line at right-angles to the original direction of march.. But nobody expected open columns to fight.
In combat columns would close up to half distance or quarter distance. These were the most common types of column. In a ‘half distance’ column, the companies were 10 yards (9m) apart and in a ‘quarter distance’ column, the companies were 5 yards (4.5m)” (Haythornthwaite, 2008). The French instead talked about “intervals but it was the same concept.
In a close column the sub units were were 1 pace apart (British) or 3 paces (French) (Haythornthwaite, 2008). The French called this a ‘close column’ colonne serée or ‘column in mass’ colonne en masse or ‘battalion mass’ (bataillon en masse) (Nosworthy, 1995). This formation was used to oppose cavalry, pass a defile or bridge or to attack ‘in certain confused situations’.
As you can see from the example, an open column by divisions has a similar depth to its width (39.3m) to allow companies to wheel out of formation. But others are much more compressed with the close column being at most 6.9m deep. For my example this is roughly 66 men wide and 9 deep.
Column function
A ‘column of route’ or ‘column of march’ was 4 files wide for battalion that normally formed 2 ranks deep and 6 files wide for those forming 3 ranks deep (Haythornthwaite, 2008). The length of the column of route never exceeded the length of the same formation in line, but could be shorter. It could quickly form a line or column of manoeuvre.
A ‘column of manoeuvre’ was used to move troops around (Nosworthy, 1995).
On occasion, ‘Columns of attack’ were hurled at the enemy (Nosworthy, 1995). More usually this term indicated an internal arrangement within the battalion. French doctrine of the time was to put the 2nd and 3rd platoons in the lead division to facilitate changes of formation; this was called an attack column (colonne d’attaque). Other nations, and earlier French practice, was to lead with the most senior company (grenadiers if present, otherwise 1st company of fusiliers).
A ‘column of waiting’ was for troops held in reserve (Nosworthy, 1995). They waited until the column adopted another function.
Blobs
Poorly trained troops, like early French levy, had less options. At Jemappes (6 Nov 1792) and Wattignies (15 Oct 1793) some French “lines dissolved into skirmishing bands, and some columns dissolved into formless masses or ‘blobs” (Griffith, 2007, p. 11). “Even professional soldiers would be thrown into a state of crisis as soon as they tried to perform changes of formation under close-range fire” (p. 17).
Ordre Mixte
French authorities often talked about mixed order (Ordre Mixte) and historians have picked up on this. Mixed order was a multi-battalion formation with some battalions in line and others in column.
I’ve already posted on Attack Column or ‘Ordre Mixte’: How did the French deploy at Albuera?. Basically, in that battle, they didn’t use Order Mixte, despite what some historians say.
Having said that, I’m sure, at the same time, in the same battle, different units formed combinations of line, column and square. Commanders would have done what was tactically expedient.
References
Arnold, J. R. (1982). “A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Napoleonic Wars”. Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 60(244), pp. 196-208.
Arnold, J. R. (2004). “A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War”. The Journal of Military History, 68(2):535-552. DOI:10.1353/jmh.2004.0006
Arnold, J. R. (2004) “A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War Oman and Historiography”, The Napoleon Series, August 2004. Available on-line at https://www.napoleon-series.org/military-info/organization/maida/c_maida.html.
Cronin, G. and Summerfield, S. (2014). Spanish Infantry of the Early Peninsular War: Uniforms, organisation and equipment of the Line and Militia. Ken Trotman.
Dempsey, G. (2008). Albuera 1811: The Bloodiest Battle of the Peninsular War. Frontline Books.
Edwards, P. (2008). Albuera: Wellington’s Fourth Peninsular Campaign, 1811. The Cromwell Press.
Esdaile, C. J. (2012). The Spanish Army in the Peninsular War (Reprised)
Griffith, P. (1990). Forward into Battle: Fighting Tactics from Waterloo to the Near Future. The Crowood Press Ltd.
Griffith, P. (2007). French Napoleonic Infantry Tactics 1792-1815 [Elite 159]. Osprey.
Haythornthwaite, P. J. (2001). Napoleonic Infantry. Cassell & Co.
Haythornthwaite, P. J. (2008). British Napoleonic Infantry Tactics 1792-1815 [Elite 164]. Osprey.
Muir, R. (1998). Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Nafziger, G. (1996). Imperial Bayonets: Tactics of the Napoleonic Battery, Battalion and Brigade as found in contemporary regulations. Greenhill Books.
Napier, W. F. P. (1828). History of the War in the Peninsula and the South of France from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814, Vol. 1, pp. 258-9.
napoleonistyka: Infantry Tactics and Combat (Part 2)
Ney, Marshal M., (1834). Instructions for the Troops Comprising the Left Corps” reprinted in the Memoirs of Marshal Ney 2 vols. Philadelphia: E.L. Carey and A. Hart.
Nosworthy, B. (1995). Battle Tactics of Napoleon and His Enemies. London: Constable.
Oliver, M. and Partridge, R. (2007). The Battle of Albuera – 1811: Glorious Field of Grief. Pen & Sword Military.
Rogers, H. C. (1974). Napoleon’s Army. Pen & Sword.
Rothenberg, G. (1997). The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon. Spellmount.
That’s a very useful analysis Steven. Thanks.
It’s served to confirm a decision that I came to, rather reluctantly, over the last year or so. That is, for my own corps level games, where the battalion is basic tactical unit, I’m going to model infantry battalions, cavalry “regiments” and artillery batteries on a single base.
I’ve been agonising for ages about whether to model those elements in such a way as to be able to depict those different formations. I desperately want to do that because it’ll look nice on the table and I’m sentimentally attached to the idea from way back. On the other hand the individual battalion, etc. is four levels below the corps commander*, so decisions and changing formation shouldn’t feature. Moreover it significantly increases the number of things that I’d have to do during a turn in order to play the game. Vis rearrange the pieces of the unit in addition to moving the unit. That definitely slows down the game. One of the reasons that Tilly plays so quickly, for example, is that there are simply fewer pieces to fiddle with.
But after reading your analysis I realise that the space taken up is broadly unchanged anyway, regardless of formation, once deployment allowances are considered. Moreover whether there unit manages to adopt the best formation in time is better reflects as in the outcome from combat.
*It’s worth noting that I’m thinking here if depicting actions that are significantly bigger in terms of numbers (~20+ battalions) than those you are discussing for Bolivar, which is another consideration.
Best regards,
Chris
Just spotted all the typos and grammatical errors! That’s the problem with doing this on my phone. 🙁
Most often half distance columns. Which is half a company= 1 platoon, as for horse, easy to wheel in needed direction , the base of formation changes.
Colonne de division had skirmishers in between the column as they should be able to deploy. Then 1/3r of the firepower plus say 1/6 but this one way more efficient as said Ardant du Pic ( 3 times) so if all is fine you don’t have a huge “fire deficit” from a full line.
One of the books I read, can’t remember which now, said 1/4 distance and 1/2 distance columns were the most common intervals. As you say, they allowed more flexibility in manoeuvre than a closed column. And I guess they were more solid than an open column.
From what I’ve read a company, in this period, formed a single platoon. 1 to 1. Although the platoons had to be balanced in size and the officers topped up platoons formed from smaller companies by moving men from bigger companies. French had two sections to a platoon and British had four sections to a platoon.
When you say “Colonne de division had skirmishers in between the column” do you mean skirmishers inside the column, between the divisions? Or do you mean between adjacent battalions?
I haven’t seen mention of skirmishers inside the column, only to the front. As I understand it, the need for detached skirmishers is why the French preferred column of platoons (5 platoons in a column) in the Peninsular rather than their more normal column of divisions (2 platoons in each of 3 lines) used in Europe.
If you mean, between battalions, then you’re probably right: 1/3rd (for the column) plus 1/6th (for the skirmishers). Which would 50% of the firepower of line. That sounds like a huge fire deficit to me.
My assumption was that the skirmishers were to the front of the columns, shielding them from view and from fire. And the skirmishers would pull back when the column pushed through to attack.
You quote Rothenberg (1997) “…column did not have to be perfectly aligned with their neighbours as they were not reliant on other units to provide flank support…”. Tilly’s concentrates on rear support which leads to checkerboard formations. Should Bolivar’s revisit this?
Also, a square, having neither flank nor rear, should it not be considered self supporting?
Yup, that is exactly how we played Bolivar: neither square nor column needed support.
However, line needs flank support i.e. friendly unit or terrain To-Flank on both left and right.
Cavalry and skirmishes are the only ones with support rules like Tilly i.e. within 4 Tum and To-Rear.
So, you’re right, there is no checkerboard in Bolivar’s Very Bad Day.
Hi Steven, I don’t think Griffith had read Clausewitz on tactics. Clausewitz is quite clear that you do *not* want to deploy your men into line for the firefight because that puts more bodies in the way of the enemy’s fire and therefore increases your own casualties. Instead fire combat should be conducted by the smallest number of skirmishers who can actually halt the enemy advance – the fewer men you deploy the fewer of your men get killed.
Once the enemy have been worn down by fire you attack with the bayonet to chase him off, for which you want superiority of numbers and again he says that at this point ‘a small instead of a great extent of front is the most advantageous’, so he prefers not to use the deployed line at this time either. Clausewitz’s writings on tactics date to 1810-12 so they are a little later than Ney, but I’m sure both points of view existed simultaneously. There are certainly plenty of famous cases where the French also formed up with no possible view to deploying into line for a firefight (e.g. Macdonald at Wagram), so I don’t think we can ascribe these to separate ‘French’ and ‘Prussian’ schools of thought.
I’m pretty sure Paddy Griffith read Clausewitz On Tactics. Senior lecturer at Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and all that.
Griffith’s (1990) key argument is that a willingness to close with the enemy, not firepower, was a key factor in combat success. I haven’t read On War but give your summary it would seem Von Clausewitz would probably agreed.
In terms of skirmishers, the “smallest number of skirmishers who can actually halt the enemy advance” must have been difficult to judge. The British certainly thought more skirmishers were better. The British skirmish line was so thick that the French thought it was the main battle line. And yet British skirmishers lacked the firepower to halt the French advance.
Based on your recommendation I’ve ordered Von Clausewitz. I’ve avoided On War in the past as my impression it was more military strategy than tactics.
Griffith (2007) discusses Wagram at some length (given constraints of an Osprey format). Macdonald’s monstrous column was formed for tactical reasons (they had routed 18 hours earlier, so were shaky, and were facing massed cavalry). And once it got close to enemy infantry it got involved in a protracted firefight.
The bit I relied on is in Clausewitz’s Instructions for the Crown Prince, not in On War itself. That has the most straightforward tactical writing that I’ve come across from him. On War is a funny book, I agree.
Certainly not claiming that everyone agreed with these ideas of his and for e.g. the Brits thought very differently. Napoleonic tactics can be confusing because the mechanics of formation changes were carefully regulated (and very similar across different armies) while the tactical use of the formations was not much regulated (and could vary within armies, never mind between). If you accept the idea that large/deep column formations could be adopted to encourage dodgy troops (as in that take on Wagram) do you want to model it in the game? Perhaps it isn’t relevant at that scale of this particular game.
Andrew, I found Clausewitz’s Instructions for the Crown Prince. I can’t see support for this, “Clausewitz is quite clear that you do *not* want to deploy your men into line for the firefight because that puts more bodies in the way of the enemy’s fire and therefore increases your own casualties”.
If fact it seems to align with what I’ve written here e.g. “If the enemy brings so many troops into the combat as to overpower our line of skirmishers, or if we cannot delay any longer, we bring forward a full line of infantry, which deploys itself at 100 or 200 paces from the enemy, and either opens fire or advances to the charge, according to circumstances.”
Hi Steven, I think in fairness you should look at the previous sub-paragraph ‘We next use light infantry—either marksmen, riflemen, or fusiliers—principally in order not to bring too many troops into action at once….If we can maintain an equal fight with the enemy with this line of skirmishers, and that there is no reason for hastening the affair, we should do wrong to hurry forward other forces; we should weary out the enemy with this kind of fight as much as possible.’ as well as the next one ‘This second line of infantry should, if possible, be used only in columns, to decide the day’
But I was mostly relying on what he says in Guide to Tactics at secs 86-96, which doesn’t seem to be in that online version you found. Here he is very explicit about the advantage of conducting the firefight with inferior numbers in the thinnest possible skirmish line. He is less explicit about the charge being made in column, saying only that a small extent of front is more advantageous.
I read the bit you are looking at in light of this other section, so to me he seems to be saying there that the advance in deployed line can be used if the skirmish line is failing, but should otherwise be avoided. That’s also how I read the line setting out the principle ‘to weary our adversary with as few troops as possible, and keep in hand a considerable mass for the last decisive moment.’ Obviously it’s Clausewitz so even when he’s trying to write straightforwardly he isn’t very good at it. His ‘ideal’ order of battle in sec.6 certainly implies that 40% of the infantry is set aside for deploying into line for the firefight and another 40% for the charge.
So when you say ‘The charges were to be conducted by lines.’ in your OP I think this is just a bit too sweeping, that’s all. Clearly some thinkers of the period thought that way, but I don’t think all of them did.
Hope this is helpful, I feel I’m getting needlessly pedantic now.
Andrew, you are right to challenge my blanket “The charges were to be conducted by lines”. I should have caveated with “usually intended”.
The debates on line versus column have been going on for a long time. The French were debating it in the 18th Century, before Napoleon marched across Europe. And during the Napoleonic Wars some French attacks certainly went in as columns. The debate revolves around whether this was deliberate and whether it was effective. The answers are, of course, contextual. We can find examples where the answers are “yes, it was deliberate, and yes, it was effective” to “no and no”.
French practice was to keep infantry in columns of manoeuvre as long as possible. That can explain Clausewitz’s ‘This second line of infantry should, if possible, be used only in columns, to decide the day’. But even that statement doesn’t assume the battalions charged in column. Columns were used to manoeuvre to the long musket range and then a variety of things could happen. Doctrine was to deploy into line, and many did. In some cases the columns went in, firing. In others the columns went in, muskets shouldered and tried to intimidate the enemy into routing. All options available to local commanders “to decide the day”.
The correct order of battle of the French post-1808 battalion from the right indeed is grenadiers (1st peloton), 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and voltigeurs (6th peloton); yet the order of the companies is different. Their order is based on the seniority of the fusiliers captains, and it is as follows: grenadiers (1st peloton), 3rd fusiliers (2nd peloton), 1st fusiliers (3rd peloton), 4th fusiliers (4th peloton), 2nd fusiliers (5th peloton) and voltigeurs (6th peloton). With the specific exception of the voltigeurs, this ensures we get the more senior captain to be the chef de division. In theory, but this is what is was. The same principle existed before 1808. See Heffeyer’s Tableau synoptiques https://www.austerlitz.org/fr/heffmeyer-et-schauenbourg/
An interesting and useful article. My area of expertise is the tactics of the American Civil War. I was a reenactor and battalion commander for over 30 years and I’ve actually gotten the chance to try out all of the formations, ployments, deployments, and variations of everything in the manuals (Scott, Hardee, Casey). It was an eye-opening experience. Things which seem very complicated were actually pretty simple with well-trained troops, while other things which seemed like they would be simple were much more complex. I am also very aware that the origins of the Civil War drill comes directly from the Napoleonic tactics so it is interesting to read about those origins.